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Broken Windows:
New Evidence from New York City
& a Five-City Social Experiment

Abstract
In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling suggested in an
influential article in the Atlantic Monthly that targeting minor disorder
could help reduce more serious crime. More than 20 years later, the three
most populous cities in the U.S.—New York, Chicago and, most recently,
Los Angeles—have all adopted at least some aspect of Wilson and
Kelling’s theory, primarily through more aggressive enforcement of minor
misdemeanor laws. Remarkably little, though, is currently known about
the effect of broken windows policing on crime.
According to a recent National Research Council report, existing
research does not provide strong support for the broken windows
hypothesis—with the possible exception of a 2001 study of crime trends in
New York City by George Kelling and William Sousa.
In this paper, we re-examine the Kelling and Sousa 2001 study and
independently analyze the crime data from New York City for the period
1989–98. In addition, we present results from an important social
experiment known as Moving to Opportunity (MTO) underway in five
cities, including New York, Chicago and Los Angeles as well as
Baltimore and Boston, which provides what is arguably the first truly
rigorous test of the broken windows hypothesis. Under this program,
approximately 4,800 low-income families living in high-crime public
housing communities characterized by high rates of social disorder were
randomly assigned housing vouchers to move to less disadvantaged and
disorderly communities. The MTO program thus provides the ideal test of
the broken windows theory.
Taken together, the evidence from New York City and from the
five-city social experiment provides no support for a simple first-order
disorder-crime relationship as hypothesized by Wilson and Kelling, nor
that broken windows policing is the optimal use of scarce law enforcement
resources.

2
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Introduction
In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling suggested in an influential
article in the Atlantic Monthly that targeting minor disorder—loitering, panhandling,
prostitution, graffiti—could help reduce more serious crime.2 The “broken windows”
theory produced what many observers have called a revolution in policing and law
enforcement.3 Today, the three most populous cities in the U.S.—New York, Chicago
and, most recently, Los Angeles—have all adopted at least some aspect of Wilson and
Kelling’s broken windows theory, primarily through more aggressive enforcement of
minor misdemeanor laws, also known as “zero tolerance” policing.4
Despite the widespread policy influence of the 1982 Atlantic Monthly essay,
remarkably little is known about the effects of broken windows. A number of leading
researchers in sociology, law, and police studies—including Wesley Skogan at
Northwestern, Robert Sampson at Harvard, Stephen Raudenbush at the University of
Michigan, Anthony Braga at Harvard, and Jeffrey Fagan at Columbia, among others—
have compiled datasets from different urban areas to explore the broken windows
hypothesis, but the evidence remains, at best, mixed. In 2000, John Eck and Edward
Maguire reviewed the empirical evidence and studies on broken-windows policing in
their contribution to Alfred Blumstein’s The Crime Drop in America (2000), and found

2

James Q. Wilson & George Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic
Monthly, Mar. 1982, at 29.
3
See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broke Windows Policing,
2-4, 46-54 (2001).
4
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani first embraced quality-of-life policing in the mid-1990s, at a
time when high crime rates began declining impressively in the City. Mayor Giuliani and his first police
commissioner, William Bratton, traced their quality-of-life initiative directly back to the Wilson and
Kelling essay. See Rudolph W. Giuliani and William J. Bratton, Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the
Public Spaces of New York, at 6 (New York: City of New York Police Department). The City of Chicago
implemented an anti-gang loitering ordinance in the early 1990s that it vigorously enforced during the
period 1993-1995 resulting in misdemeanor arrests of over 42,000 individuals (City of Chicago v. Morales
1999:49). In October 2002, Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn appointed William Bratton police commission
on a platform that promised a broken-windows approach. According to news reports, “Mr. Bratton said his
first priority after being sworn in on Oct.2 28 [2002] would be ending the smile-and-wave approach to
crime fighting. He said he wanted policing based on the so-called broken-windows theory.” See Charlie
LeDuff, Los Angeles Police Chief Faces a Huge Challenge, NY Times (Oct 24, 2002); see also Tina Daunt
and Megan Garvey, Bratton Lays Out Ambitious Set of Goals for LAPD, LA Times (Oct 4, 2002); Megan
Garvey, Bratton Is Planning a Clean Start; The police chief, who will be sworn in today, sees fighting
graffiti as key to reducing crime, LA Times, Metro Desk, p. 1 (Oct. 25, 2002).
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that there is little evidence to support the claim that broken-windows policing contributed
to the sharp decrease in crime during the 1990s.5
However, a recent report by a blue-ribbon panel commissioned by the National
Research Council (NRC)—which is itself part of the National Academies of Science,
chartered in 1863 by Congress to advise the federal government on scientific matters—
suggests that there may be new evidence in support of the broken windows theory.6 The
NRC notes that “there is a widespread perception among police policy makers and the
public that enforcement strategies (primarily arrest) applied broadly against offenders
committing minor offenses lead to reductions in serious crime. Research does not provide
strong support for this proposition … A recent study of New York [City] precincts,
however, indicates a strong relationship between the rate of arrests for minor crimes and
crime rates in precincts in New York (Kelling and Sousa, 2001).7 Using a multilevel
research design, the authors provide one of the first indications of a direct link between a
generalized program of intensive enforcement and declines in more serious crime. While
the study uses an innovative modeling approach to estimate this effect, limitations in the
data available raise questions regarding the validity of the results…”8
The study by George Kelling and William Sousa, titled Do Police Matter? An
Analysis of the Impact of New York City’s Police Reforms and published by the
Manhattan Institute in December 2001, shows that aggressive misdemeanor arrest
policies in New York City account for the significant drop in crime during the mid- to
late-1990s.9 The 2001 Kelling and Sousa report has received significant media attention.
5

John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An
Assessment of the Evidence, in The Crime Drop in America 228 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds.,
2000); see also, Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style,
97 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (1998); Harcourt, Illusion of Order, supra note __.
6
Wesley Skogan and Kathleen Frydl, editors, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence.
Washington, DC: National Academies Press 2004.
7
The report is referring here to George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter? An
Analysis of the Impact of New York City’s Police Reforms, Manhattan Institute Center for Civic Innovation
Civic Report No. 22 (2001).
8
Skogan and Frydl, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing, supra note __, at 229-30.
9
The Kelling and Sousa report was issued with a simulcast editorial comment by the authors in the
New York Post. “So what does all this mean?” Kelling and Sousa ask. “First, it means that New Yorkers
should stop listening to critics who contend that police tactics matter little, if at all, in determining crime
rates.” These critics, the authors note, “have been parroting what is virtual dogma in criminal-justice
circles, that crime is caused by ‘root causes’ such as racism, poverty and social injustice.” In contrast, the
authors declare, “This study places the ‘root cause’ theory of crime in serious jeopardy” George L. Kelling

6/29/2005

HARCOURT & LUDWIG: BROKEN WINDOWS

5

In addition to being viewed as the only promising evidence by the NRC, the Economist
reported on the study,10 as did the New York Times,11 the Wall Street Journal,12 and the
Boston Globe,13 both of the latter in editorials, and the Atlanta Constitution.14 For
example, the Wall Street Journal’s editorial page argued: “A brand new report from the
indispensable Manhattan Institute chronicles these law-and-order achievements and
explains what made them possible. . . . ‘Do Police Matter?’ also does a great public
service in thoroughly refuting those media critics and political opponents of the
Republican Mayor who’ve insisted for the past eight years that the NYPD had little if
anything to do with the fall in crime. In this alternative universe, the city's drop in crime
should be credited to low unemployment from a booming economy. Or the decline in
crack cocaine use that had plagued the 1980s. Or the demographic reality that the
proportion of young males—the most common offenders—to the general population had
dropped. In fact, none of these alternative explanations stands up to scrutiny.”15
An even more recent working paper distributed by the National Bureau of
Economic Research, by economists Hope Corman and Naci Mocan, applies a slightly
different empirical approach to data from New York City and claims to support the
Kelling-Sousa conclusion.

16

Corman and Mocan analyze monthly time-series data for

New York City as a whole and claim that the dramatic increase in misdemeanor arrest
rates in New York during the 1990s is responsible for a large share of the city’s drop in

& William H. Sousa, Jr., Editorial, Tough Cops Matter, N.Y. Post, Dec. 19, 2001, at 41. The New York
Post carried its own editorial the same day, It’s the Cops, Stupid, N.Y. Post, Dec. 19, 2001, at 42.
10
As New York’s Inexperienced New Mayor takes Office, What Lessons Should He Draw From His . .
., The Economist, Jan. 5, 2002
11
Kevin Flynn, Study Says a Slumping Economy Doesn’t Mean Crime Will Rise, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,
2001, at 8.
12
New York’s Finest, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 2001.
13
Boston Globe editorial (2001) “Behind Giuliani’s Jab.” 29 December 2001, at A14.
14
Colin Campbell, New York a Blueprint for Cutting Atlanta Crime, The Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 23,
2001, at 5F.
15
New York’s Finest, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 2001. Even the Courier-Mail, the Queensland newspaper,
reports on the 2001 study, reporting that “in precinct after precinct Kelling and Sousa found a similar
pattern—as ‘broken windows’ policing was increased, violent crime declined.” Ron Bruton, Broken
Windows’ Plan Shatters Crime Theory, Courier-Mail (Queensland), Jan. 5, 2002, at 24. Kelling and Sousa
have also placed editorials in The Australian, Turn Up the Heat and Beat Serious Crime, The Australian,
Oct. 3, 2002, The Cincinnati Post, Ways of Policing Matter, The Cinncinati Post, Jan. 7, 2002, at 8A, and
The Harrisburg Patriot, Broken Windows’: Paying Attention to Neighborhoods Can Reduce Crime,
Harrisburg Patriot, Jan. 3, 2002, at A13.
16
Hope Corman and Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows, NBER Working Paper 9061
(July 2002).
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crime over this period. So while Kelling and Sousa use variation across precincts over
time in misdemeanor arrests and crime rates to identify the effects of the former on the
latter, Corman and Mocan use city-wide variation over time to generate a similar finding.
Moreover Corman and Mocan point to deterrence as the most plausible mechanism for
this relationship, given that misdemeanor arrests typically result in either no jail time or
short spells of incarceration.17 The Kelling and Sousa study, together with the Corman
and Mocan paper, are thus important contributions, representing the best existing
evidence supporting the broken-windows hypothesis and the related (and widespread)
broken-windows or zero-tolerance policing strategy.
In this article, we set out to re-analyze and assess the best available evidence from
New York City about the effects of broken windows policing. We demonstrate that the
pattern of crime changes across New York precincts during the 1990s that Kelling and
Sousa attribute to broken windows policing is more consistent with what statisticians call
mean reversion: Those precincts that received the most intensive broken windows
policing during the 1990s are the ones that experienced the largest increases in crime
during the city’s crack epidemic of the mid- to late-1980s. Consistent with findings
elsewhere from city-level data,18 jurisdictions with the greatest increases in crime during
this period tend to experience the largest subsequent declines as well. We call this
Newton’s Law of Crime: What goes up, must come down (and what goes up the most,
tends to come down the most). For similar reasons we argue that the Corman and Mocan
study is also unable to convincingly determine that broken windows policing is a causal
contributor to crime rates in New York City.
Because our re-analysis of the New York data leaves us with a Scotch verdict—
“not proven”—we then turn to data from a unique randomized experiment operated by
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development known as Moving to
Opportunity (MTO), which provides a unique opportunity to test the original Wilson and

17

As Corman and Mocan (2002, p. 14) note, only about 9% of misdemeanor arrests result in
imprisonment, with an average sentence length of 27.5 days. So the expected prison time for a
misdemeanor arrest is about 2.6 days.
18
See generally Steven Raphael and Jens Ludwig, “Do Prison Sentence Enhancements Reduce Gun
Crime? The Case of Project Exile,” 251-286, in Evaluating Gun Policy, Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook,
ed. Washington, DC: Brookings (2003).

6/29/2005

HARCOURT & LUDWIG: BROKEN WINDOWS

7

Kelling broken windows thesis. MTO has been in operation since 1994 in five cities,
including the three largest cities in the country that have adopted aspects of broken
windows policing (New York, Chicago and L.A.) as well as Baltimore and Boston.
Under MTO a total of around 4,800 low-income families living in public housing
communities characterized by high rates of crime and social disorder were randomly
assigned housing vouchers to move to less disadvantaged and disorderly communities.
The random assignment of families to neighborhoods in MTO helps overcome the
problem of determining the causal effects of neighborhood disorder on individual
criminal behavior that plagues most previous studies in this literature.19
The implications of MTO for the ongoing debates about the broken windows
theory have never yet been explored.20 Yet the results from MTO suggest that moving
people to communities with less social or physical disorder—the key intervening factor in
the original Wilson and Kelling broken windows hypothesis—on balance does not lead to
reductions in their criminal behavior. It is important to note that MTO changed multiple
aspects of people’s neighborhoods: MTO families moved to neighborhoods that were less
disorderly, but also had fewer low-income families and more high-status households.
MTO thus tests the combined effects of less disorder and increased affluence within a
community, which is arguably the policy-relevant “treatment combination” for
neighborhoods under the broken windows model because reductions in disorder, like
other improvements in neighborhood amenities, should on average translate into
increased neighborhood gentrification.
Taken together our examination of data from New York City and MTO provide
no support for the idea that “broken windows” activities, including zero-tolerance
policing or other measures designed to reduce the level of social or physical disorder
within a community, represent the optimal use of scarce government resources.

19

Because most people have at least some degree of choice over where they live and with whom they
associate, previous non-experimental studies may confound the effects of neighborhood disorder and other
characteristics on people’s behavior with the effects of difficult-to-measure individual attributes that
influence both their involvement with crime and their choice of residential neighborhood.
20
While recent results of neighborhood effects on criminal behavior have been published in
economics, see Jeffrey R. Kling, et al., Neighborhood Effects on Crime for Female and Male Youth:
Evidence from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2005),
these findings are currently not widely known outside of that field and, as a result, their implications for
broken windows has never been explored.
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The paper is organized as follows. Part I of the paper locates the broken windows
theory within the sociological and policy traditions and reviews preceding efforts to test
the broken windows theory and the practice of broken-windows policing. Part II of the
paper then presents our discussion of the evidence from New York City. Part III then
presents our findings from the MTO experiment demonstrating that randomly assigning
people to move to less disorderly communities does not yield the simple “less disorder,
less criminal activity” result that broken windows policing predicts.

PART I.
A.

Locating the Broken Windows Theory
The Socio-Legal Theoretical Context

There is a long tradition within socio-legal research of studying visual cues of
neighborhood disorder and exploring the relationship between those neighborhood
characteristics and deviance. Prompted by a recurring observation of dramatic variations
in crime rates across neighborhoods, the tradition grew over decades of research taking
seriously the idea that there may be “neighborhood effects” on the production of crime:
That is, arrangements in social space may significantly affect human behavior. This
research tradition traces importantly to the early Chicago School of sociology—
especially the monographs on neighborhoods and spatial settings, the Jewish ghetto,21 the
Italian “slum,”22 the Near North side of Chicago,23 taxi-dance halls,24 and brothels25—and
to the later social interactionist research of Irving Goffman, especially his study Behavior
in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings,26 and others such as
Albert Cohen27 and Jane Jacobs.28
One of the most striking findings from the neighborhood effects research comes
from the dramatic differences across neighborhoods in rates of crime and delinquency—
21

L. Wirth, The Ghetto (1928).
William F. Whyte, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum (1943).
23
H. W. Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum (1929).
24
P. G. Cressey, The Taxi-Dance Hall (1932).
25
W. Reckless, Vice in Chicago (1933).
26
Ervin Goffman, Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings (1963).
27
Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang (1955).
28
Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961). As Andrew Abbott notes,
“Chicago felt that no social fact makes any sense abstracted from its context in social (and often
geographic) space and social time. Social facts are located.” Andrew Abbott, Of Time and Space: The
Contemporary Relevance of the Chicago School. 75 Social Forces 1149, 1152 (1997).
22
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even across neighborhoods with similar concentrations of social disadvantage as
measured by average rates of poverty, unemployment, familial and residential instability,
and dependence on government benefit programs.29 Robert Sampson and Stephen
Raudenbush trace the rich intellectual history and the variations over time in
neighborhood-effects research in their thorough paper, Systematic Social Observation of
Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods (1999).30
A consideration of the research in this area suggests two lasting puzzles. The first
focuses on locating sources of variation in crime across neighborhoods and identifies two
leading candidates. First, differences in crime rates across areas could be due to
unobservable individual characteristics related to the residents of the neighborhood, and
thus the possibility of self-selection on the part of the individuals. Put differently, some
neighborhoods may have more crime because they are home to a larger share of crimeprone people, although all of the individual attributes that predispose some people to
engage in criminal activity are difficult to measure in social science datasets. A second
explanation is that variation across areas in crime rates may be due to differences in
social processes and conditions across neighborhoods, including disorderliness or
informal mechanisms of social control. The notion of social disorganization pioneered by
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay31 represented one effort to locate the answer to this first
puzzle, at least in part, in mechanisms of informal social control and collective action—in
identifying an agency of social control that could be disrupted by residential mobility and
economic conditions. Sampson, Raudenbush, and Fenton Earls’ Project on Human
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) research represents another answer
focused on informal social processes, more specifically on the notion of “collective
efficacy,” which they define as “the linkage of cohesion and mutual trust with shared
expectations for intervening in support of neighborhood social control.”32
A second puzzle focuses on the issue of remedies. Even if the neighborhoodeffects research suggests a causal relationship between, on the one hand, identifiable
29

See, e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996, Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997.
See Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A
New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, American Jounral of Sociology 105(3):603-651 (1999).
31
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press (1942).
32
Sampson and Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation, supra note __ at 612-613.
30
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social processes or neighborhood characteristics and, on the other hand, crime, does the
causal explanation offer insight into what can be done to change things in a public policy
sense? In this regard, the sociological theories have been relatively quiet, reflecting a
general hesitation to move from the positive to the prescriptive.
It is within this rich research field that the “broken windows” hypothesis emerged
in the early 1980s. Though first articulated and tested by Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford
psychologist, in the late 1960s, the broken windows theory was most clearly articulated
and popularized in James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s article titled Broken
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly
in 1982.33 “Disorder and crime are inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental
sequence,” Wilson and Kelling argued, so that efforts to reduce disorder might ultimately
translate into reductions in criminal activity as well.34 Minor social disorder—littering,
loitering, public drinking, panhandling, and prostitution—as well as physical disorder—
graffiti, abandoned buildings, and littered sidewalks—if tolerated in a neighborhood,
produce an environment that is likely to attract crime. These forms of disorder signal to
potential criminals that delinquent behavior will not be reported or controlled—that no
one is in charge. To law-abiding citizens, these disorderly conditions signal the need to
avoid the streets or even flee the neighborhood. One broken window, left unrepaired,
invites other broken windows. These progressively break down community standards and
leave the community vulnerable to crime. In this way, disorder breeds crime: “Such an
area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that
here,” Wilson and Kelling wrote, “drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and
cars will be stripped. That the drunks will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the
prostitutes' customers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps
violently.”35
The broken windows theory thus addresses the first puzzle of the neighborhoodeffects literature in a straightforward and provocative way: it is the variations in disorder
in neighborhoods that explains the variation in crime, holding structural disadvantage
constant. The real trigger is disorderliness itself. The theory was familiar to sociologists
33

Wilson & Kelling, supra note __.
Id. at 31
35
Id. at 31-32
34
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because of its proximity to theories of urban decay and social contagion. Urban
sociologists interpreted the broken-windows hypothesis through the lens of urban decline:
disorderliness, dilapidation, abandonment, and social disorder, such as prostitution,
public intoxication and drug use, reflected and reinforced, in a cyclical manner, declining
property values, residential instability, and the gradual decay of the urban
neighborhood.36 Philip Cook and Kristin Goss offer a closely-related interpretation
focusing on a standard model of “social contagion.”37 From the contagion perspective,
the broken-windows phenomenon reflects an information cascade: people with imperfect
information about the risks and rewards of criminal activity may infer the net returns to
crime from the social environment.38 Information limitations are at the heart of the
information cascade model. Here, the potential criminals do not know the probability of
being detected in a neighborhood, but the lack of enforcement of minor crime and
disorder fills this void and signals low enforcement. The characteristics of the local
physical environment, which are themselves the product of the accumulated series of
behaviors of local residents, thus communicate the statistical likelihood of being
apprehended. They are a signaling mechanism that feeds into the calculus of whether to
commit crime. This “contagion” interpretation offers a straightforward explanation of
broken windows familiar to most sociologists and economists.39
As to the second puzzle—concerning the public policy prescriptions—the Broken
Windows essay itself did not compel a particular policy outcome. From a policy
perspective, the broken windows hypothesis is in principle consistent with a variety of
potential policy levers, ranging from changes in policing to community organizing.
36

See Wesley Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Cities
(1990); Gerald E. Frug, City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls (1999).
37
Philip J. Cook & Kristen A. Goss, A Selective Review of the Social-Contagion Literature (Sanford
Institute of Public Policy Studies, Duke University, Working Paper, 1996).
38
Id.
39
For a discussion of the etiology of less-serious and more-serious crimes, see Michael Gottfredson
and Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 1990. For a
discussion of how “routine activities” across neighborhoods may affect criminal opportunities and
outcomes, see Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson, “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine
Activity Approach,” American Sociology Review 44:588-608 (1979), and Lawrence Cohen, James Kluegel,
and Kenneth Land, “Social Inequality and Predatory Criminal Victimization: An Exposition and Test of a
Formal Theory,” American Sociological Review 46:505-24 (1981). Additional discussion of the “social
disorganization” model of disorder and neighborhood effects on crime is provided by Robert J. Bursik, Jr.,
“Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and Prospects,” Criminology
26:519-52 (1988).
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Nevertheless, most policymakers seem to have understood the theory as implying what
has come to be known as “broken-windows policing”—also known as “ordermaintenance,” “zero-tolerance,” or “quality-of-life” policing. So for instance, in their
2001 study, George Kelling, the co-author of the original Broken Windows essay, and
William Sousa suggest that the most effective way to address disorder and reduce crime
is to increase the number of misdemeanor arrests.40
B.

Testing the Broken Windows Hypothesis

To date, empirical testing of the broken windows theory has taken one of two
forms. A first approach attempts to measure neighborhood disorder and crime, as well as
other correlates of criminality, such as poverty and residential instability, in order to
determine whether there are statistically interesting correlations between these variables.
A second approach has focused on measures of broken-windows policing—for instance,
rates of misdemeanor arrests—and conducts relatively similar statistical analyses on these
variables in order, again, to identify significant correlations. We begin by reviewing the
first approach.
1.

Disorder and Crime

Early on, many proponents of the broken-windows hypothesis pointed to the
research of Wesley Skogan, especially his monograph Disorder and Decline: Crime and
the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods (1990), and argued that it empirically
verified the broken-windows theory.41 Skogan’s book, Disorder and Decline, addressed
the larger question of the impact of neighborhood disorder on urban decline, but in a
section of the book, Skogan discussed the broken windows hypothesis, ran a regression
of neighborhood disorder on robbery victimization, and concluded that “‘Broken
windows’ do need to be repaired quickly.”42 Many observers interpreted this as an
endorsement of the broken-windows theory and accepted Skogan’s view of the evidence.
George Kelling, co-author of Broken Windows43 and of a book entitled Fixing Broken
40

Kelling & Sousa, supra note __.
Skogan, supra note __.
42
Id. at 75.
43
Wilson & Kelling, supra note __.
41
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Windows,44 contended that Wesley Skogan “established the causal links between disorder
and serious crime—empirically verifying the ‘Broken Windows’ hypotheses.”45 Dan
Kahan at Yale similarly argued that “[t]he work of criminologist Wesley Skogan supplies
empirical support for the ‘broken windows’ hypothesis.”46 Subsequent work by one of
the co-authors of this article, however, has cast some doubt about what conclusions can
properly be drawn from Skogan’s analysis.47
A few years later, Ralph Taylor of Temple University conducted research in
sixty-six neighborhoods in Baltimore using longitudinal data, and attempted to determine
the relationship between neighborhood crime and what he terms social and physical
“incivilities”—panhandlers, public drunks, trash graffiti and vacant lots, among other
things. What he found was that, while certain types of incivilities were associated with
crime or urban decay, others were not. In his book, Breaking Away from Broken
Windows, Taylor concludes from his data that different types of incivilities may require
different policy responses. “Researchers and policy-makers alike,” Taylor writes, “need
to break away from broken windows per se and widen the models upon which they rely,
both to predict and to preserve safe and stable neighborhoods with assured and
committed residents.”48
One of the most comprehensive and thorough studies of the broken windows
theory to date is Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush’s 1999 study. Their study
grows out of the PHDCN and is based on systematic social observation: using trained
observers who drove a sports utility vehicle at five miles per hour down every street in
196 Chicago census tracts, and randomly selecting 15,141 street sides, they were able to
collect precise data on neighborhood disorder. With regard to the disorder-crime nexus,
Sampson and Raudenbush found that disorder and predatory crime are only moderately
correlated, but that, when antecedent neighborhood characteristics are taken into account,
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George Kelling & Catherine Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime
in Our Communities (1996).
45
Id. at 24.
46
Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Virginia Law Review 349, 369
(1997); see also Dan Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology, 95 Michigan Law Review 2477, 2488
n.62 (1997).
47
Harcourt, Illusion of Order, supra note __, at 59–78.
48
Ralph B. Taylor, Breaking Away From Broken Windows: Baltimore Neighborhoods and the
Nationwide Fight Against Crime, Guns, Fear, and Decline, at 22 (2001).
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the connection between disorder and crime “vanished in 4 out of 5 tests—including
homicide, arguably our best measure of violence.”49 They nevertheless suggest that
disorder may have indirect, neighborhood effects on crime by influencing “migration
patterns, investment by businesses, and overall neighborhood viability.”50
On the basis of their extensive research, Sampson and Raudenbush conclude that
“[a]ttacking public order through tough police tactics may thus be a politically popular
but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime.”51 As an alternative to the
broken-windows theory, Sampson and Raudenbush suggest that disorder is of the same
etiology as crime—being, so often, forms of minor crime—and that both crime and
disorder have the same antecedent conditions. “Rather than conceive of disorder as a
direct cause of crime, we view many elements of disorder as part and parcel of crime
itself.”52 Thus, “a reasonable hypothesis is that public disorder and predatory crimes are
manifestations of the same explanatory process, albeit at different ends of a ‘seriousness’
continuum.”53
2.

Studies of Aggressive Misdemeanor Arrest Policing

Another strand of research, focusing on studies of aggressive arrest policies, was
also brought to bear on the broken-windows hypothesis. Here too, James Q. Wilson
sparked the debate, primarily with his 1968 book on the Varieties of Police Behavior, and
his research with Barbara Boland on the effects of police arrests on crime.54 Wilson and
Boland hypothesized that aggressive police patrols, involving increased stops and arrests,
have a deterrent effect on crime.

49

Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A
New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 American Journal of Sociology 603, 637 (1999).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 638
52
Id. at 608
53
Id. Sampson and Raudenbush have a more recent study showing that neighborhood racial
composition affects people's perceptions of neighborhood disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004). They
conclude as a result that order maintenance may not be helpful because it affects actual but not perceived
disorder (2004:337). For a study of disorder and youth crime in Canada, see John Hagan and Bill
McCarthy, Mean Streets: Youth Crime and Homelessness. New York: Cambridge University Press (1997).
54
James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, “The Effect of the Police on Crime,” Law & Society Review
12: 367–390 (1978); James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, “The Effects of the Police on Crime: A
Response to Jacob and Rich,” Law & Society Review 16: 163–169 (1981).
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A number of contributions ensued, both supporting and criticizing these findings,
but, as Robert Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen suggested back in 1988, the results were
“mixed.”55 There have been strong contributions to the literature, such as the 1999 study
led by Anthony Braga, titled “Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A
Randomized Controlled Experiment,” published in Criminology.56 But still, most of this
research is unable to distinguish between the broken windows hypothesis and more
traditional explanations of incapacitation and deterrence associated with increased police
arrests, presence, contact and surveillance. The problem is somewhat endemic to the
design of these studies. As Sampson and Cohen conclude with regard to their own work,
“[i]t is true that our analysis was not able to choose definitely between the two alternative
scenarios.”57
In this vein, Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies test, in their research titled Policing
Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control in New York, whether quality-of-life
policing in New York City contributed to the reduction in lethal violence in the late
1990s. They analyze precinct crime rates from 1999 and try to determine whether these
crime rates can be predicted by the amount of stop-and-frisk activity that occurred in the
precinct in the preceding year. Based on their research, Fagan and Davies find that “[f]or
both violence arrests broadly and homicide arrests specifically, there is no single category
of citizen stops by police that predicts where crime will increase or decrease in the
following year.”58 When they examine homicide fatalities, they observe different effects
by type of stop and by victim race. “Stops for violence are significant predictors of
reductions in both gun homicide deaths and overall homicide deaths, but only among
Hispanics.”59 In contrast, for African-Americans, no type of arrests predicts homicide
victimization a year later; and for whites, the results are not reliable because of the low
white homicide victimization rate.

55

Robert J. Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen, “Deterrent Effect of the Police on Crime: A Replication
and Theoretical Extension,” 22 Law and Society Review 163, 166 (1988).
56
Anthony A. Braga et al., “Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized
Controlled Experiment,” Criminology 37 (1999): 541–580; see also Anthony A. Braga, Problem-Oriented
Policing and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press 2002.
57
Sampson and Cohen, supra note __, at 185
58
Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control in New York,
in Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003).
59
Id.
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Why is it that there may be effects for Hispanics, but not for African-Americans?
Fagan and Davies suggest that it may have to do with what they call “stigma saturation”
in black communities: when stigma is applied in ways that are perceived as too harsh and
unfair, it may have reverse effects. They write, “When legal control engenders resistance,
opposition or defiance, the opportunity to leverage formal social control into informal
social control is lost. The absence of crime control returns from OMP policing may
reflect just such a dynamic among African Americans, who shouldered much of the
burden of OMP.”60
The final and most recent contribution to this literature is Steve Levitt's 2004
Journal of Economic Perspectives review essay, in which Levitt argues that policing
practices probably do not explain much of the crime drop in the 1990s because crime
went down everywhere, even in places where police departments did not implement new
policing strategies. Instead, Levitt attributes the massive period effects on crime
throughout the U.S. during the 1990s to some combination of increased imprisonment,
increases in the number of police, the ebbing of the crack epidemic that started in many
big cities in the mid-1980s, and the legalization of abortion in the U.S. during the early
1970s.
PART II.

New York City’s Experience

In this section we discuss the most recent studies on broken-windows policing in
New York City, both the Kelling and Sousa (2001) study and the evidence presented by
Corman and Mocan (2002). We argue that the Kelling and Sousa (2001) analysis has
limitations that ultimately render it uninformative about the causal effects of broken
windows policing practices. We also show that the Corman and Mocan (2002) analysis
cannot support the claim that broken windows policing activities are responsible for
declines in crime.
A.

The Kelling and Sousa (2001) Study

The study by George Kelling and William Sousa (hereafter KS) fits in the larger
tradition of studies of aggressive arrest policies discussed earlier. The goal of their study
60

Id.
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is the “systematic attempt to statistically parse out the relative contributions of police
actions, the economy, demographics, and changing drug use patterns on crime” in New
York City. The major problem with previous studies, they argue, is that those studies lack
an adequate comparison group for New York City: previous research has either used an
unsuitable comparison, such as other cities, or failed to use any comparison at all. The
key insight in this study, Kelling and Sousa suggest, is to simulate comparison groups by
treating the city as 75 separate and comparable entities. “Rather than one city,” they
explain, “we view New York as 75 separate entities, corresponding to the 75 police
precincts.”61
The research design, then, is to statistically compare the relationship between
violent crime and four dependent variables—broken-windows policing, economic
indicators, young male population shifts, and the decline in crack cocaine consumption—
in the 75 precincts of New York City. They find a strong negative relationship between
precinct-level misdemeanor arrests and violent crime. In what follows we re-examine
these NYC results using a wide variety of alternative statistical approaches. Our efforts to
obtain, replicate and extend their data are discussed in detail in Appendix A.
Replicating the KS results is complicated in part by the fact that in neither the KS
Manhattan Institute report nor Sousa’s dissertation do the authors spell out the exact
estimating equations for their analysis. Nor does their Table 4, which presents their key
results, show the number of observations used to generate their estimates (to give some
sense for how the analysis is structured). Nevertheless, from reading over the discussion
in KS and in Sousa’s dissertation it would appear that they are estimating a two-level
hierarchical linear growth model, of the sort discussed in Chapter 6 of Raudenbush and
Bryk (2002).62 If we let level 1 in this model represent time (subscripted by t) and level 2
represent precincts (subscripted by i), we believe that the two-level linear growth model
that they are estimating is given by the following equations:

61

Kelling & Sousa, supra note __ at 1, 4. In 1994, a precinct was divided in two, resulting in 76
precincts existing today. To maintain consistency over the studied period, the authors use the original 75
precincts.
62
Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data
Analysis Methods, Second Edition (2002).
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(1)

VCti = π0i + π1i At + εti

(2)

π0i = α00 + α01 MAi + α02 Xi + r0i

(3)

π1i = α10 + α11 MAi + α12 Xi + r1i

18

where
VCti = violent crimes in precint (i) in year (t)
At = time (1989, 1990, …, 1998)
MAi = precinct (i)’s average misdemeanor arrests over the sample period
Xi = average value of other covariates for precinct (i) over sample period
The empirical setup that is being estimated by KS is easier to see by substituting
equations (2) and (3) into (1) to get the reduced-form estimating equation (4):
(4)

VCti = β1 + β2 MAi + β3 At + β4 MAi*At + εti
We can replicate the key coefficient in their analysis (β4 or, equivalently, α11) as

shown in the first row of Table 1, where we estimate equation (4) measuring all of our
variables in precinct counts (rather than per capita rates) and do not weight by precinct
population.63 Note that as shown in Table 1, these estimates are not very sensitive to
decisions about whether to weight by precinct population or not, or to work in per capita
crime and arrest rates rather than counts. Note also that the coefficient and standard error
for the effects of misdemeanor arrest rates on the time slope in violent crimes—which is
the key estimate of interest—is identical to what is reported in KS, their Table 4,
although our point estimates for the intercept terms have a slightly different scaling.
Kelling and Sousa conclude from these results that broken windows is a highly
effective crime-fighting strategy. The bottom line: “The average NYPD precinct during
the ten-year period studied could expect to suffer one less violent crime for
approximately every 28 additional misdemeanor arrests made.” This, Kelling and Sousa
63

Note that we can also reproduce the point estimate and standard error for the time slope in their
unconditional model (-131, se=10 or 11, Manhattan Institute Table 3), which is just a regression of violent
crimes against time (this regression has N=750, not weighting by precinct population, works in precinct
crime counts not rates). All of these results from f:\research\broken_windows2\stata\jens_regs_jan2105.do
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suggest, offers “the most-definitive possible answer to the question of whether police
mattered in New York City during its intense crime-drop.”64
Our conclusion from these results is somewhat different, and points in the
direction of mean reversion. Any study of the influences on American crime patterns
during the past 20 years is complicated by the massive period effects that have generated
dramatic year-to-year changes in crime across the country. The increase in crime rates
was particularly dramatic from the mid-1980s through the early- to mid-1990s, which is
thought to have been driven largely by the growth in crack cocaine use and involvement
of firearms in the new street markets for crack.65 Using city-level data, Steven Raphael
and Jens Ludwig show that those cities that experienced the largest increases in crime
during this period subsequently also experienced the largest crime drops.

66

A natural

concern is to worry that the same process may be at work at the neighborhood or police
precinct level as well.
Figure 1 suggests that crime patterns across New York precincts that KS attribute
to the effects of broken windows policing can be explained by mean reversion: Broken
windows policing (as measured by misdemeanor arrests) was conducted most intensively
in New York within the city’s most violent neighborhoods, which are the areas that
experienced the largest increases in violent crime during the 1980s and the largest
declines in violent crime during the 1990s. Panel A shows that at the start of the KS panel
(1989) precincts with higher violent crime rates also have higher rates of misdemeanor
arrests. That is, the regression line relating violent crime and misdemeanor arrests in
1989 has a positive slope, consistent with Kelling and Sousa’s own findings (top panel of
their Table 4). Panel B shows that the most violent precincts in 1989 also experienced the
largest increase in misdemeanor arrests from 1989–98. Panel C shows that the

64

Kelling & Sousa, supra note __ at 1.
Alfred Blumstein, “Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry.” Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 86: 10–36 (1995); Philip J. Cook and John H. Laub, “After the Epidemic: Recent Trends
in Youth Violence in the United States,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 8571
(2001) (available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8571).
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Steven Raphael and Jens Ludwig, “Do Prison Sentence Enhancements Reduce Gun Crime? The
Case of Project Exile,” 251-286, in Evaluating Gun Policy, Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook, ed.
Washington, DC: Brookings (2003).
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neighborhoods with the highest violent crime rates in 1989 experience the largest
declines in such crimes from 1989–98.
Why do precincts with unusually high initial crime rates experience unusually
large declines in crime thereafter? Mean reversion is a good candidate—Panel D shows
that, as is true with city-level crime data, those police precincts with the largest increases
in crime during the crack epidemic have the largest declines thereafter. Most
criminologists believe that this increase in violent crime was driven by the crack cocaine
epidemic and attendant violence in the crack market, which began to ebb during the early
1990s—hence those places where crack served to drive violent crime to unusually high
levels at the height of the epidemic would be expected to experience the largest
subsequent declines as the influence on violence from crack use and distribution begin to
wane.
The KS analysis seems particularly susceptible to confounding from mean
reversion because their model basically relates changes in violent crimes (each precinct’s
linear trend in violent crime over the 1989–98 period) against the levels of misdemeanor
arrests (average arrests from 1989 to 1998). Put differently, their analysis throws away
all of the over-time variation in misdemeanor arrests across precincts from 1989 to 1998,
and simply relates variation in the linear trend in violent crime rates across precincts to
variation in the average number of misdemeanor arrests over this period.67 The level of
misdemeanor arrests are strongly related to the initial level of violent crimes, as
suggested by Figure 1, which may lead to a spurious association between misdemeanor
arrests and violent crimes in their study.68
67

In this sense their two-level linear growth model is set up in a fashion analogous to Raudenbush and
Bryk’s 2002 example on p. 167, relating changes in student’s test scores measured four times each year
over several years with the total hours of instruction the child received. But the time trend in the key
treatment variable of interest in the policing example seems to matter much more than in the schooling
example offered by Raudenbush and Bryk.
68
The problem of relating levels against changes can be illustrated with a simple hypothetical example:
Precinct
Year
MA
VC
1
1989
150
500
1
1990
100
400
1
1991
50
300
2
1989
75
500
2
1990
50
475
2
1991
25
450
Precinct 1 has a higher mean number of misdemeanor arrests over the sample period than does precinct 2
(100 versus 50), and also experiences a larger decline in violent crimes per year (100 per year compared to
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Table 2 presents the results of a more formal analysis that seems to implicate
mean reversion. The first column of Table 2 presents estimates for the parameters in
equation (5), where the change in violent crimes within a precinct for the period 1989 to
1998 is regressed against the average misdemeanor arrests within that precinct over the
entire 1989 to 1998 period. This simple model is based on the same intuition as the HLM
linear growth model of KS, although the key difference is that our dependent variable is
the actual change in violent crimes from 1989 to 1998 for each precinct rather than each
precinct’s estimated linear trend in violent crimes over this period. (The choice by KS to
fit a linear trend through these violent crime counts for each precinct is itself a bit
puzzling given that Appendix Figure 1 in our paper and Figure 1 in their Manhattan
Institute report show a non-linear trend in such crimes in New York over this period, first
increasing for a few years and then declining thereafter). The average number of
misdemeanor arrests within these precincts has a strong negative relationship with the
change in violent crime rates over this period, as with the basic results presented by KS.
(5)

ΔVCi = λ1 + λ2 MAi + vi

The remaining columns of Table 2 show that controlling for either the precinct’s
1989 violent crimes or change from 1984 to 1989 in violent crimes reduces the
coefficient on the average misdemeanor arrest variable by more than two-thirds. The
reason is suggested by Figure 1: The average number of misdemeanor arrests over the
1989–98 period is highest in those precincts that experienced the largest increases in
crime from 1984–89 and had the largest number of violent crimes in 1989. Statistically
relating the average number of misdemeanor arrests from 1989–98 with the decline in
violent crimes over this period without controlling for differences across precincts in the
run-up in violent crime they experienced during the crack epidemic mistakenly attributes
the influence of these initial conditions and subsequent mean reversion to the average
number of misdemeanor arrests. Unfortunately none of the proxies for crack, including
the borough-level measure of cocaine-related hospital discharges used by Kelling and
only 25 in precinct 2). The Kelling-Sousa model applied to these data would suggest a negative
relationship between misdemeanor arrests (MA) and the time trend in violent crime (VC) across precincts –
more misdemeanor arrests, less crime. However regressing changes against changes – the change over
time in violent crimes against the change in misdemeanor arrests – would yield the opposite conclusion.
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Sousa, seem to adequately capture the influence of crack markets and use on crime. For
example the cocaine proxy used by KS does not have a statistically significant
relationship to violent crime rates in their own analysis (see KS, Table 4), nor is this
variable statistically significant when included in our own models (and by implication
does not change any of the other results shown in our Table 2, either).
In contrast to the weak explanatory power of the KS proxy for crack-related
violence—admittedly an extremely difficult phenomenon to quantify—the final column
of Table 2 shows that controlling for the set of detailed precinct-level covariates in our
dataset yields an estimated relationship between the change in violent crime and the
1989–98 average number of misdemeanor arrests that is about 10% as large as the
baseline estimate and no longer statistically significant. These covariates include
measures of structural disadvantage (such as the percent of the precinct that is poor,
receiving public assistance or has less than a high school degree), demographics (percent
of the precinct in their peak offending ages, percent households headed by a female,
percent black), measures of physical disorder (percent housing units that are vacant), and
police manpower assigned to the precinct.69
(6)

ΔVCi = λ1 + λ2 Δ MAi + vti

Now suppose we instead use the within-precinct over-time variation in the data by
relating changes in violent crime rates from 1989 to 1998 to changes over this period in
misdemeanor arrests, as in equation (6). The results from this analysis, shown in Table 3,
suggest that if anything, increases in misdemeanor arrests are accompanied by increases
in violent crime—more misdemeanor arrests, more crime. While the positive relationship
between changes in misdemeanor arrests and changes in violent crime is somewhat
sensitive to the model specification, there is no evidence from this first-difference model
for a negative relationship between changes in misdemeanor arrests and violent crime.

69

The police manpower variable is potentially problematic because some arrests within a precinct
might be made by law enforcement officers that are officially assigned to different areas, although our
results are not sensitive to excluding this variable. Adding just a control for the percent of the precinct’s
population that is black to the baseline model in the first column of Table 2 reduces the coefficient on
average misdemeanor arrests from -.30 to -.28. Including the Kelling and Sousa measures of cocainerelated hospital discharges and borough-level unemployment rates has little effect on the results shown in
Table 2.
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The expectation that violent crime should decline in response to an increase in
misdemeanor arrests is the key empirical prediction of the argument that broken windows
policing is effective. While the Kelling-Sousa analysis does not directly test this
prediction, our own analysis shown in Table 3 demonstrates that the data are not
consistent with the idea that stepped-up zero tolerance policing reduces crime.
B.

The Corman and Mocan (2002) Study

But even putting aside these precinct comparisons, for many observers, the
massive drop in New York City’s crime rate during the 1990s—coincident with the onset
of broken-windows policing in the City—alone provides compelling proof for the
efficacy of this policing strategy. Corman and Mocan’s analysis provides a more formal
version of this same insight, by analyzing monthly time-series data for New York City as
a whole. Controlling for city-wide measures of New York’s unemployment rate, real
minimum wage, incarceration rate, police manpower, number of 14–16 year olds and
lagged values of monthly crime rates, they find a negative relationship between city-wide
misdemeanor arrest rates and city-wide robbery and motor vehicle theft rates. They do
not find a relationship between the former and other types of crime. While Corman and
Mocan’s time series uses data from 1970 to 2000, graphs of their data suggest that the
relationship between misdemeanor arrests and crime would appear to be driven by the
unusually large increase in misdemeanor arrests that occurred in New York during the
mid- to late-1990s.70
What can we conclude about the causal effects on crime of broken windows
policing—at least as measured by misdemeanor arrests? Research designs that rely on
time series data for a single jurisdiction (in their case, New York) typically provide weak
power to rule out alternative explanations for the patterns observed in the data. For
example, consider just one candidate counter-explanation, what we term the “Broken
Yankees Hypothesis” (BYH). When the New York Yankees do well, violence should
decline through the strengthened social ties that develop by the bonding that occurs
among the city’s residents at local bars and restaurants, with much of the city’s attention
70

Corman and Mocan (2002, Figure 11) show that after hovering between 9,000 and 14,000 between
1982 and 1994, the number of misdemeanor arrests in New York City nearly doubled from 1994 to 2000.
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focused on a single, shared goal. When the Yankees do poorly residents may be less
likely to aggregate together for a common purpose in communal settings, and moreover
the team’s poor performance may even spur dissension among New Yorkers over the
causes of these failures.
While Corman and Mocan were not willing to share their monthly time-series
data with us, we were able to construct on our own an annual time series for New York
measuring crime rates and a reasonable proxy for the operational mechanism behind the
Broken Yankees Hypothesis, defined as the cumulative number of World Series
championships dating back to 1921.71 Figure 2 provides what appears to be some
empirical support for the BYH: the strong performance of Billy Martin’s Yankees teams
during the late 1970s coincides with a drop in homicides, but even more striking is the
massive decline in homicides that accompanies the consistent excellence of Joe Torre’s
squads beginning in the late 1990s. A time-series regression of the homicide rate against
the BYH index and lags of the murder variable frequently yields a negative and
statistically significant coefficient (and even controlling for lagged values of robbery to
proxy for other criminogenic characteristics), although we note that the magnitude of the
point estimate and standard error is somewhat sensitive to the choice of lag length.
While our simple empirical example is not intended to provide a rigorous test of
the Broken Yankees Hypothesis, it does serve to highlight the vulnerability of single-city
time series findings to counter-explanations. An equally or perhaps even more plausible
counter-explanation for New York City’s crime pattern during the 1990s comes from the
dramatic period effects that caused crime to decline almost everywhere throughout the
U.S. during this period, even in cities that did not adopt innovative policing strategies.72

71

These data come from the Yankees web site:
http://newyork.yankees.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/nyy/history/championships.jsp
72
Levitt 2004. Levitt argues that crime declined throughout the U.S. during the 1990s due to some
combination of increased spending police, increased incarceration, the ebbing of the crack epidemic that is
widely thought to have caused violent crimes to increase during the late 1980s, and legalization of abortion
during the early 1970s. While we find Levitt’s explanation persuasive, accepting the specific bundle of
causal factors implicated by Levitt is not crucial to our argument for a skeptical interpretation of Corman
and Mocan’s findings. One need only accept Levitt’s observation that crime dropped everywhere over this
period to accept the importance of common period effects in understanding crime drops during the 1990s.

6/29/2005

Part III:

HARCOURT & LUDWIG: BROKEN WINDOWS

25

Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment

Suppose that we could design the ideal social experiment to test the effects of
disorder alone on criminal behavior. We would start with a sample of people who were at
high-risk for criminal offending, and were living in very socially disordered
communities. We would then randomly assign some of these families, but not others, to
neighborhoods that were less disorderly—ideally, much less disorderly, so that the
“treatment dose” that families experience from neighborhood moves would be large
enough to yield statistically detectable impacts on behavior. In this idealized experiment
we would then wish to follow participants for many years, measure their involvement in
criminal activity in different ways (for example with both self reports and administrative
arrest records) as well as characteristics of their neighborhoods, and be careful to
minimize sample attrition.
The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, launched in 1994 by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, conforms in every way to the
parameters of the ideal experiment described above. In what follows we provide a review
of the effects of MTO on criminal offending by program participants about 5 years after
random assignment, and discuss their implications for ongoing debates about broken
windows policies.73
We show that MTO succeeds in moving families to neighborhoods that are
characterized by much lower levels of both physical and social disorder—arguably a
more relevant “treatment indicator” for measuring the broken-windows policing
hypothesis compared to more indirect policy levers such as misdemeanor arrests that may
or may not succeed in reducing disorder. However, we also show that the findings from
MTO are not consistent with the idea that changes in neighborhood disorder is enough to
change criminal activity.

73

These results are reported in greater technical detail in Kling, et al., supra note __, and Jens Ludwig,
et al., Neighborhood Effects on Crime Over the Life Cycle (Georgetown University Public Policy Institute,
Working Paper, 2005).
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Background on MTO

Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
MTO has been in operation since 1994 in five cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and New York. Eligibility for the program was restricted to low-income
families with children in these five cities, living within public or Section 8 project-based
housing in selected high-poverty census tracts.74 The approximately 4,600 families who
volunteered for the program from 1994 to 1997 were randomly assigned into one of three
groups. The Experimental group was offered the opportunity to relocate using a housing
voucher that could only be used to lease a unit in census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of
10 percent or less.75 Movers through MTO were required to stay in these tracts for at least
one year. Experimental group families were also provided with mobility assistance and in
some cases other counseling services as well. Families assigned to the Section 8 group
were offered housing vouchers with no constraints under the MTO program design on
where the vouchers could be redeemed. Families assigned to the Control group were
offered no services under MTO, but did not lose access to social services to which they
were otherwise entitled such as public housing.
Because of random assignment, MTO yields three comparable groups of families
living in very different kinds of neighborhoods during the post-program period. This
random assignment helps overcome the self-selection problem that is very likely to
plague most previous studies of “neighborhood effects” in general or “broken windows”
in particular.
The results summarized below from Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005) and Ludwig,
Kling and Hanratty (2005) measure the delinquency and criminal behavior of youth in
MTO using two main sources: survey data and administrative arrest records. Adults were
also surveyed but they were not asked about criminal behavior, so we can only measure
adult criminal activity using official arrest records. Information on potential mediating

74

Section 8 project-based housing might be thought of as essentially privately-operated public housing
(Olsen 2003). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development contracts with private providers to
develop and manage housing projects that include units reserved for low-income families.
75
Housing vouchers provide families with subsidies to live in private-market housing. The subsidy
amount is typically defined as the difference between 30 percent of the household’s income and the HUDdefined Fair Market Rent, which equals either the 40th or 45th percentile of the local area rent distribution.
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processes that could lead to these outcomes comes from the surveys as well as
administrative data on local-area crime rates.76
The families in the main survey sample enrolled in the MTO demonstration from
1994 to 1997. At the time of enrollment, the head of household completed a baseline
survey which included information about the family as well as some specific information
about each child. Descriptive statistics for the baseline characteristics of youth and adults
are shown in Table 4. Overall about two-thirds of MTO participants are black, with the
program populations in Chicago and Baltimore almost entirely black and an even mix
between black and Hispanic in the other sites. MTO households are quite poor, with
around three-quarters having been on welfare at baseline. One quarter of household heads
had their first child before the age of 18, and only a little more than half of all heads had a
GED or high school diploma. Around three-quarters of households report gangs and
drugs as the first or second most important reason they enrolled in the MTO program,
while around one-half report access to better schools as one of their top two reasons.
Eligibility for the MTO program was limited to families in public housing or Section 8
project-based housing located in some of the most disadvantaged census tracts in the five
MTO cities and, for that matter, in the country as a whole.
Consistent with random assignment of families to MTO groups, Table 4 shows
that there are no statistically significant differences across MTO groups in the fraction of
male or female adults or youth who have ever been arrested prior to random assignment
or for other baseline characteristics. These results together with those presented
elsewhere suggest that MTO random assignment was in fact random.77
Of the families with youth in the survey sample (15–20 at the end of 2001), 44
percent of those in the experimental group and 57 percent of those in the Section 8 group
complied with treatment (that is, relocated through MTO). These moves lead to
substantial differences across treatment groups in neighborhood attributes, as seen in
Table 5. Four years after random assignment the average census tract poverty rate (from
the 2000 Census) for families assigned to the Section 8 group was 18% lower than that of
the Control group, while families assigned to the Experimental group had average census

76
77

For more detail on these data sources see Appendix A of Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2004).
Kling, et al., supra note __.
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tract poverty rates 24% below those of Controls. Assignment to either the Experimental
or Section 8 groups reduces local-area (police precinct) violent crime rates by 13–15%
compared to Controls, with proportionally smaller effects on property crime rates. Given
the changes in tract poverty rates induced by MTO, it is surprising that the program
engenders so little residential integration with respect to race. The average family in all
three MTO groups lives in a census tract where the large majority of residents are also
members of racial or ethnic minorities.
The bottom panel of Table 5 presents results from surveys of MTO adults
conducted from 4–7 years after random assignment about their perceptions of physical
and social disorder within their neighborhoods, as well as the quality of local policing.
Adults assigned to the Experimental or Section 8 groups are less likely than Controls to
report that neighbors would fail to get involved if local youth were truant or engaging in
delinquency (spray painting graffiti). The next row shows that adults in the Experimental
and Section 8 group also report less physical disorder as well compared to the reports of
adults in the Control group, as measured by the fraction that report that graffiti is a
problem in the neighborhood.
Orr et al. (2003) demonstrate that MTO reduces a wide variety of other selfreported measures of neighborhood social and physical disorder as well for both the
experimental and Section 8 groups relative to controls, including 20–30% increases in the
fraction who feel safe in their neighborhood at night, one-quarter reductions in the share
who saw drugs in their neighborhood the past 30 days, 10–15% declines in the share who
report problems with litter, trash, graffiti, or abandoned buildings in the neighborhood,
15–25% declines in the share who report problems with public drinking or groups of
people hanging out in public spaces, and 10–25% increases in the share who are satisfied
or very satisfied with their neighborhoods.78
The last row highlights the potential problems with the key explanatory variable
used in the Kelling and Sousa (2001) study, namely the police precinct misdemeanor
arrest rate. These data are available for New York but not the other MTO sites. The final
row of Table 5 shows assignment to either the Experimental or Section 8 groups
78

Larry Orr, et al., Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration Program: Interim Impacts
Evaluation Exhibit 3.5, 66 (Washington D.C.: Office of Policy Development and Research, US HUD,
2003).
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substantially reduces the local misdemeanor arrest rate compared to the neighborhoods in
which the Control group resides.79 Yet the survey data reported by the MTO participants
reveal that Experimental or Section 8 assignment also reduces social and physical
disorder. This fact reinforces the notion that there are many ways to reduce disorder
within a community beyond stepped-up policing against minor crime, and measures of
zero-tolerance policing such as misdemeanor arrests need not be very informative about
variation across neighborhoods in actual disorder.
MTO enables us to rigorously test what happens to individuals’ criminal behavior
when they move to neighborhoods characterized by what broken windows theory predicts
should be of greatest relevance—disorder.80 Of course as Table 5 shows, MTO also
induces changes in a variety of other characteristics of the communities in which program
participants live, including lower crime rates, fewer low-income residents and more
residents with high levels of schooling or occupation in high-status jobs. Findings from
MTO thus provide a test of the combined effects of reducing community disorder
together with increasing neighborhood affluence, the sort of combined neighborhood
changes that we would expect in normal circumstances: When government policies
reduce neighborhood disorder, an important local amenity, we would expect
gentrification to occur to some degree and so change the socio-economic composition of
the neighborhood somewhat.
B.

Effects of MTO on Criminal Behavior

Analysis of arrest records and survey data suggests that moving to a less
disadvantaged, less disorderly neighborhood on net does not reduce criminal behavior for
MTO program participants. While some sub-groups do respond to moves to less
79

This finding is consistent with our analysis above demonstrating that the highest levels and largest
increases in misdemeanor arrests in New York City during the 1990s were in the highest crime (and so
presumably most disadvantaged) police precincts.
80
Ideally we would wish to complement the survey-based measures of social and physical disorder
obtained from MTO adults with measures for systematic social observation (SSO) of the sort pioneered by
the PHDCN research team (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). Such data were not collected as part of the
MTO evaluation for cost and other reasons, although fortunately PHDCN research shows that, at least for
Chicago neighborhoods, measures of disorder from SSO and surveys are highly correlated (Sampson and
Raudenbush 1999, Table 3, p. 625). SSO measures of disorder are also highly correlated with neighborhood
structural disadvantage (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999, Table 2, p. 624). The fact that various measures
of disorder and structural disadvantage are all highly correlated means that MTO provides a test for the
causal effects of changing all of these neighborhood attributes simultaneously.
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disorderly neighborhoods by reducing their involvement in criminal behavior, most
notably female youth, these effects are offset by increases in anti-social behavior among
other sub-groups. Nothing in broken windows theory or most other models of
neighborhood effects suggests that such influences on criminal behavior should be
strongly contingent on people’s demographic characteristics. So at the very least broken
windows is not a complete explanation for how communities influence criminal behavior,
since even if the broken windows mechanism is at work for MTO participants other
behavioral processes seem to dominate for at least some sub-groups. Moreover for policy
purposes what is most relevant is the impact of neighborhood disorder on the overall
offending rate, and MTO provides fairly strong evidence that for at least this population
there is no net reduction in crime or other anti-social behaviors.
The first row of Table 6, adapted from Ludwig, Kling and Hanratty (2005),
summarizes the main MTO finding: When we pool youth and adults, using data for both
males and females, and compare overall arrests across MTO groups, we find no
statistically significant differences in arrest rates for people who live in neighborhoods
with quite different levels of physical and social disorder. The intent-to-treat (ITT)
estimates compare the average number of arrests for everyone assigned to the
Experimental versus Control group or Section 8 versus Control, regardless of whether the
family has moved through the MTO program.81 The estimates for the effects of
treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) are essentially equal to the ITT estimates divided by the
fraction of families in the Experimental group (or Section 8 group, for the Section 8Control estimate) that relocate through the MTO program (Bloom, 1984). 82
81

These across-group differences are calculated with regression-adjustment for a series of baseline
survey characteristics such as household head race, age, educational attainment and employment status, as
well as indicators for pre-random assignment arrests. Because of random assignment, regression adjustment
for these characteristics has little effect on the point estimates for the across-group differences but helps
improve the precision of our estimates (that is, reduce the standard errors) by accounting for residual
variation in the outcome measures of interest. We calculate robust standard errors that are adjusted for the
clustering of adult and youth participants within the same households. The estimates also use weights to
account for changes in the random assignment probabilities over time during the course of the MTO
demonstration.
82
The TOT estimate will be an unbiased estimate of the effects of treatment on the treated if random
assignment is truly random, and if assignment to the treatment group has no effect on those who do not
move through MTO. This second assumption may not be literally true, since the counseling services and
search assistance offered to treatment families may influence later mobility patterns or other youth
behaviors even among families that do not relocate through MTO. The disappointment of searching but
failing to find an apartment may also affect non-movers in the treatment groups. If the effects of treatment-
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The second row shows that for females the effects on arrests of assignment to the
Experimental or Section 8 rather than Control group are negative but not statistically
significant, while for males the across-group differences are positive and not quite
significant at the conventional cutoff level. The remaining panels of Table 6 disaggregate
the results by crime type. For females, the treatment-control group differences in arrests
are negative (albeit not significant) for violent, drug and other crimes, but not for
property crimes. Males assigned to the Experimental group experience more propertycrime arrests than do those assigned to the Control group.
Heterogeneity in people’s responses to moving to a less disorderly, less
disadvantaged neighborhood arises with respect to age as well as gender. Figure 3 from
Ludwig, Kling and Hanratty (2005) shows average arrest rates for MTO participants in
each of the three MTO groups by age at the end of 2001, where each panel shows results
separately by crime type and gender. These results come from re-estimating the intent-totreat estimates with an interaction between the treatment indicator variables and a cubic
polynomial in age, and then presenting the predicted values of arrests-by-age for each
group implied by the parameter estimates. The eight panels of Figure 3 taken together
suggest that on balance moving to a less disadvantaged, less disorderly neighborhood has
more beneficial (or less detrimental) effects on younger compared to older MTO
participants.83 In national data most crime seems to be committed by adults, even though
offending rates per year are higher for teens,84 so the detrimental effects on adults are not
as encouraging as one might like from a policy perspective.

group assignment are substantially smaller for those who do not move through MTO compared to those
who do, our TOT estimates will approximate the effects of MTO moves on those who move through the
MTO program. Mechanically, we calculate TOT estimates using two-stage least squares where we use
indicators for random assignment outcomes as instruments for indicators for MTO treatment take-up.
83
One concern with these results stems from the use of official arrest data, which capture the combined
effects of the behavior of both MTO participants and local criminal justice agencies. Variation in the
probability of arrest (P) across neighborhoods will affect the likelihood that a criminal event (C) results in
arrest (A), with A = P×C. Above we showed that compared to adults assigned to the Control group, those in
the Experimental or Section 8 group report that local police are more responsive to calls for service. If
responsiveness of police to 911 calls is positively correlated with the probability of arrest, so that the
probability of arrest is higher in more affluent areas, then our analysis of arrest data may understate any
effects of the MTO experimental and Section 8 treatments that reduce criminal behavior and overstate any
effects that lead to an increase in criminal offending.
84
For example in 1998, 81.3% of all people arrested in the United States for any crime were ages 18 or
older at the time; the figures for violent and property crime equal 82.8 and 65.2 percent, respectively. See
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in then United States, 1997,
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Additional evidence to suggest that moving to a less disorderly, less
disadvantaged community does not on net reduce criminal behavior comes from the selfreported survey data collected for program participants. Survey data on youth reveal no
statistically significant differences across groups (for either males or females) in selfreported arrests or delinquency, and an increase in self-reported problem behaviors
among males in the Experimental compared to Control groups (Kling, Ludwig and Katz,
2005).85
The sharp gender difference in youth responses to moving to a less disorderly,
less disadvantaged neighborhood do not appear to be driven by different responses by
males and females to the stress and disruption of moving per se, in part because in the
first few years after random assignment experimental males experience fewer violentcrime arrests compared to controls.86 The gender difference in effects—also found in
recent MTO research on education, substance use, mental health, and physical health87–
seems to reflect differences in how males and females respond to similar neighborhoods.
Boys and girls in the same randomly assigned treatment groups move into similar types
of neighborhoods, and within families, brothers and sisters respond differentially to the
same mobility patterns.88
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998, pp. 232-3. For evidence of differential offending
rates by age see Figure 3 in the present paper.
85
Comparing the control group’s mean self-reported arrest rate with what is implied by the
administrative records suggest that the former are susceptible to considerable under-reporting. Whether this
is also true for the behavior problems index, which reveals a positive Experimental-control difference for
male youth, is not clear. Of course misreporting would have to be systematically different across groups in
order to affect the estimate for across-group differences in behavior problems.
86
Previous studies of the Baltimore, Boston and New York sites that use the exogenous variation in
neighborhoods induced by MTO within individual demonstration sites on balance yield evidence consistent
with the view that moving to less distressed communities reduces anti-social behavior by youth, at least in
the short run (1 to 3 years from random assignment). In the Boston site, boys in the experimental and
Section 8 groups exhibit about one-third fewer problem behaviors compared to controls in the short run
[Katz, Kling and Liebman 2001]. For the Baltimore site, official arrest data suggest that teens in both
treatment groups are less likely than controls to be arrested for violent crimes. These short-run impacts are
large for both boys and girls, but not statistically significant when disaggregated by gender [Ludwig,
Duncan and Hirschfield 2001]. Short-term survey data from the New York site reveals no statistically
significant differences across groups in teen delinquency or substance use [Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn
2003]. 5-year data for MTO reveal that there were short-term declines in violent criminal offending for
males in the experimental versus control groups in every site except for New York, which then dissipated
over time, which suggests that changes over time in the effects of neighborhood mobility, rather than
idiosyncracies of the Boston or Baltimore sites, is the way to reconcile the short-term and medium-term
results from MTO.
87
See Kling and Liebman (2004).
88
See Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005).
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The findings from MTO suggest that either declines in community disorder do not
translate into reductions in individual criminal behavior or, at the very least, that any
effects on criminal activity from less disorder are outweighed by the countervailing
effects from increased neighborhood socio-economic status. These results would seem to
suggest that any policy intervention that reduces disorder may not reduce people’s
criminal behavior if such changes are also accompanied by gentrification that alters the
composition of neighborhoods in a fashion analogous to what the Experimental or
Section 8 families experience in MTO.
PART IV: Conclusion
When Wilson and Kelling proposed the idea of broken windows in the early
1980s many academic researchers were skeptical about the ability of police activities to
reduce crime. But since that time, a new body of empirical literature has, convincingly in
our view, demonstrated that increased police spending does indeed reduce crime,89 and
that targeting police resources against the highest-crime “hot spots” can also help prevent
criminal activity.90 Outside of perhaps a few remaining university departments and some
Berkeley coffee shops, the notion that “police matter” is (or at least should be) widely
accepted. The key scientific and policy question behind the Kelling and Sousa analysis is
thus whether asking police to focus on minor disorder crimes as in broken windows
policing yields more pronounced reductions in violent crime than does having police
focus on violent crimes directly. Our analysis provides no empirical evidence to support
the view that shifting police towards minor disorder offenses would improve the
efficiency of police spending and reduce violent crime.
We have set out, in this paper, not only to assess the best available evidence for
the broken windows theory—George Kelling and William Sousa’s 2001 study—but also
to rethink the research design most appropriate to studying the broken windows
hypothesis. We demonstrate that the pattern of crime changes across New York City
precincts during the 1990s that Kelling and Sousa (2001) attribute to broken windows
policing is equally consistent with mean reversion: Those precincts that received the most

89
90

Levitt, 1997, 2002.
Sherman, 2002.
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intensive broken windows policing are the ones with the largest increases and levels in
crime during the city’s crack epidemic. Consistent with findings elsewhere from citylevel data,91 jurisdictions with the greatest increases in crime during this period tend to
experience the largest subsequent declines as well. The data from MTO experiment
reveal that moving to a less disorderly, less disadvantaged community on balance does
not appear to reduce criminal behavior among the MTO program population. If disorder
does affect crime, any such effects are small enough to be dominated by whatever
pernicious effects on people’s criminal behavior may arise from increases in
neighborhood socio-economic status, as would be expected to occur in normal
circumstances as neighborhoods with declines in disorder begin to gentrify.
When asked in January 2004 whether the broken-windows theory had ever been
empirically verified, James Q. Wilson reportedly told the New York Times: “People have
not understood that this was a speculation.”92 The theory was not based on empirical data,
Wilson emphasized. “We made an assumption that a deteriorating quality of life caused
the crime rate to go up.”93 As to whether that assumption is right, Wilson states, still in
2004: “I still to this day do not know if improving order will or will not reduce crime.”94
As Wilson noted in a different interview, “God knows what the truth is.”95
Yet, understanding the ability of a broken-windows policy to affect disorder and
crime is important for both legal and scientific purposes. The notion that broken windows
policing might reduce crime is plausible because many of the behavioral mechanisms
underlying this policing strategy are at least in principle consistent with existing models
of social contagion.96 Since the Almighty has so far resisted the temptation to publish in
scholarly journals, our results help answer Wilson’s question in the interim. Our bottom
line is that there appears to be no good evidence that broken-windows (or zero-tolerance)
policing reduces crime, nor evidence that changing the desired intermediate output of
broken-windows policing—disorder itself—is sufficient to change criminal behavior.

91

Raphael and Ludwig, 2003.
Dan Hurley, On Crime as Science (a Neighbor at a Time), N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2004, at F1.
93
Patricia Cohen, Oops, Sorry: Seems That My Pie Chart is Half-Baked, N.Y. Times, April 8, 2000, at
92

B7.

94

Hurley, supra note __.
Cohen, supra note __
96
See, e.g. Cook & Goss, supra note __.
95
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Table 1
Replicating Kelling and Sousa’s Multi-Level Model with a Reduced-Form Single
Equation Model
Model specification:

Coefficient on MA

Coefficient on MA*A

Counts, not pop weighted

72.68 (5.94)

–.036 (.003)

Counts, pop weighted

70.06 (13.20)

–.035 (.007)

Rates, not pop weighted

509.95 (0.27)

–.255 (.0001)

Rates, pop weighted

139.02 (76.56)

–.070 (.038)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Each row in Table 2 represents the results from
estimating a separate regression of the form VCti = β1 + β2 MAi + β3 At + β4 MAi*At + εti
where VC = violent crimes for precinct (i) in year (t), MA = misdemeanor arrests for
precinct (i) in year (t), and A = year (ranging from 1989 to 1998). See text for additional
details.

Table 2
The Effects of Model Specification and Mean Reversion
in the Kelling-Sousa Analysis: Regressing Crime Changes Against Arrest Levels
Dependent variable = Precinct change violent crimes, 1989–98
Explanatory
variables:
Avg. misdemean
arrests, 1989–98
Violent crime
1989
Change violent
crimes 1984–89
Chg. Manpower,
1989–98
Other
covariates?
N
R-squared

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

–.303**
(.035)

–.221**
(.023)

–.079**
(.019)
–.546**
(.029)

–.082**
(.022)
–.524**
(.057)
–.069
(.162)

–.101**
(.019)
–.528**
(.048)
–.053
(.137)
4.070**
(.763)

–.031
(.024)
–.576**
(.055)
–.097
(.140)
3.786**
(.944)

N

N

N

Y

–1.338**
(.124)

N

N

75

74
.504

74
.811

74
.915

74
.914

74
.939

.970

F:\research\broken_windows2\stata\jens_meanreversion_april605.do
Other covariates include change 1989–98 in poverty, racial and age composition of the
population, percent households headed by females, public assistance, vacant housing.

6/29/2005

HARCOURT & LUDWIG: BROKEN WINDOWS

36

Table 3
The Effects of Model Specification and Mean Reversion
in the Kelling-Sousa Analysis: Regressing Crime Changes Against Arrest Changes
Dependent variable = Precinct change violent crimes, 1989–98
Explanatory
variables:
Change avg.
misdemean
arrests, 1989–98
Violent crime
1989
Change violent
crimes 1984–89
Chg. Manpower,
1989–98
Other
covariates?
N
R-squared

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

–.086
(.074)

.046
(.051)

.114**
(.022)

.114**
(.022)

.094**
(.025)

.004
(.030)

–.660**
(.023)

–.710**
(.039)
.214
(.133)

–.716**
(.039)
.243*
(.133)
1.412
(.963)

–.625**
(.041)
–.013
(.127)
3.326**
(1.065)

–1.762**
(.183)

N

N

N

N

N

Y

75
.018

74
.561

74
.924

74
.926

74
.928

74
.969

F:\research\broken_windows2\stata\jens_meanreversion_april605.do
Other covariates include change 1989–98 in poverty, racial and age composition of the
population, percent households headed by females, public assistance, vacant housing.
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Figure 1: Misdemeanor Arrests and Violent Crime in NY Precincts, 1989–98
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Figure 2: NYC Homicides vs Yankee Championships
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Table 4
Baseline Descriptive Statistics for MTO Adult and Youth Samples
FEMALES
Exp

S8

Control

MALES
Exp

S8

Control

ADULTS
Black
Hispanic
MTO site:
Baltimore
Boston
Chicago
LA
NYC
HH on AFDC at
baseline
Moved because:
Drugs, crime
Schools
Age at end of 2001
Any pre-RA arrest
Missing admin arrest
data
N
YOUTH
Black
Hispanic
MTO site:
Baltimore
Boston
Chicago
LA
NYC
HH on AFDC at
baseline
Moved because:
Drugs, crime
Schools
Age at end of 2001
Any pre-RA arrest
Missing admin arrest
data
N

.650
.294

.646
.297

.657
.298

.359
.505

.364
.494

.386
.487

.150
.229
.209
.155
.257

.162
.223
.209
.149
.257

.147
.221
.210
.158
.264

.039
.211
.149
.304
.297**

.071
.192*
.128
.351
.259

.051
.287
.131
.345
.185

.739

.752

.756

.579

.586

.491

.783
.465
39.13

.739
.469
43.00

.260

.375

.755
.577
43.39
.423

.764
.489
44.84
.354

.035

.056

.048

.057

.767
.468
38.96
.258
.038
1,483

.755
.521**
39.40
.231
.054
1,013

1,102

224

153

166

.647
.296

.606
.318

.640
.304

.609
.329

.605
.333

.612
.339

.168
.187
.210
.165
.270

.138
.192
.215
.185
.271

.140
.216
.203
.199
.242

.151
.166
.220
.195
.269

.154
.200
.209
.189
.248

.139
.189
.205
.196
.270

.732

.744

.749

.743

.706

.727

.807
.460
19.05

.732
.524
18.90

.782
.483
18.90

.780
.511
19.02

.760
.549
18.86

.791
.505
18.96

.062

.041

.048

.147

.122

.131

.057

.048

.055

.059

.063

.061

966

651

716

988

691

739

Source: Ludwig, Kling and Hanratty (2005).
NOTES: * = Difference with control mean statistically significant at 10 percent cutoff.
** = Difference with control mean statistically significant at 5 percent cutoff.
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Table 5
Effects of Moving to Opportunity Random Assignment on Community Disorder
and Other Neighborhood Characteristics
Control—all

Exp—all

Exp—movers

S8—all

S8—movers

Neighborhood characteristics, 4
yrs after randomization (All 5
MTO sites)
Avg tract poverty rate

41.68

31.70

19.24

34.38

28.49

% in tract w/ pov 0 – .2
% in tract w/ pov .2 – .4
% in tract w/ pov > .4

13.43
33.73
52.83

33.75
33.90
32.35

65.05
26.81
8.14

21.91
42.46
35.63

29.74
51.61
18.65

Avg tract black
Avg tract minority
Violent crime rate
Property crime rate

53.93
89.27
235
513

53.27
84.20
204
491

41.29
73.94
128
373

52.05
87.83
200
463

50.79
85.08
201
508

Neighbors would not likely do
something about truant children

.65

.53

.43

.57

.58

Neighbors would not likely do
something about spraying or
graffiti

.47

.36

.26

.41

.40

Problem in neighborhood with
graffiti

.48

.38

.19

.40

.32

Problem in neighborhood with
police not coming when called

.33

.22

.11

.27

.23

6838

5294

3587

5758

4428

Adult survey reports on
neighborhood in 2002
(All 5 sites):

Misdemeanor arrest rate, 4 yrs
after randomization (NY site
only)

Note: Panel on adult survey reports from Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005), for adults with youth ages 15–25 at end of 2001.
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Table 6
Effects of MTO Random Assignment on Arrests to Youth and Adults
Controls
All crimes
All

1.123

Females

0.759

Males

1.994

[0.256]
Violent crimes
All
0.322
Females

0.23

Males

0.54

Property crimes
All
0.329
Females

0.257

Males

0.502

Drug crimes
All

0.26

Females

0.136

Males

0.558

Other crimes
All

0.212

Females

0.136

Males

0.394

E-C
ITT

E-C
TOT

S8-C
ITT

S8-C
TOT

0.031
[0.053]
–0.049
[0.047]
0.225

0.072
[0.120]
–0.111
[0.107]
0.513
[0.131]

0.015
[0.060]
–0.036
[0.051]
0.136
[0.298]

0.027
[0.104]
–0.062
[0.089]
0.237
[0.147]

–0.017
[0.017]
–0.024
[0.016]
0
[0.042]

–0.039
[0.040]
–0.055
[0.035]
0
[0.096]

–0.001
[0.022]
–0.029
[0.018]
0.063
[0.054]

–0.002
[0.038]
–0.051
[0.031]
0.109
[0.094]

0.056
[0.026]
0.025
[0.030]
0.131
[0.050]

0.128
[0.060]
0.057
[0.068]
0.3
[0.115]

0.031
[0.027]
0.016
[0.030]
0.066
[0.052]

0.054
[0.048]
0.028
[0.052]
0.115
[0.091]

0
[0.024]
–0.032
[0.020]
0.077
[0.063]

0
[0.055]
–0.073
[0.045]
0.176
[0.143]

–0.024
[0.025]
–0.018
[0.022]
–0.036
[0.065]

–0.041
[0.044]
–0.031
[0.037]
–0.062
[0.113]

–0.008
[0.016]
–0.018
[0.014]
0.016
[0.039]

–0.018
[0.036]
–0.041
[0.032]
0.037
[0.090]

0.009
[0.018]
–0.005
[0.015]
0.043
[0.048]

0.016
[0.031]
–0.009
[0.026]
0.075
[0.083]

NOTES: Source—Ludwig, Kling and Hanratty (2005). Sample consists of 2731 males and 6402 females,
which reflects a pooled sample of youth 15–25 at the end of 2001 plus MTO adults. The gender disparity in
the sample arises because most MTO households are headed by a single female, and so there are far more
female than male adults in the sample. The youth sample is gender balanced. Standard errors in bracket
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Figure 3: MTO Treatment Effects on Lifetime Arrests by Age and Gender
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Figure 3, Continued
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Appendix A: New York City Data
As noted earlier, Kelling and Sousa refused to share their data with us.
Fortunately we have been able to obtain the same crime and arrest data from the NYPD
used by Kelling and Sousa (2001) as their key dependent and explanatory variables. To
measure broken-windows policing, KS use precinct-level reports of total misdemeanor
arrests. To measure violent crime, KS use precinct-level reports of four violent offenses
(murder, rape, felonious assault, and robbery). In all cases, KS use data from 1989 to
1998. We have these data from 1989 through 2000, and so have the option of examining
whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of additional year’s worth of precinctlevel information. We also have precinct-level reports for other types of crime, including
property offenses, which enables us to explore the pattern of BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING effects across crime types.
One challenge for the KS study and for ours as well is that data on important
potential confounding factors is not readily available for NYC at the precinct level. To
proxy the effect of the crack epidemic, they use borough-level reports of hospital
discharges for cocaine-related episodes. To proxy the number of young males, they use
precinct-level school enrollment data. To measure unemployment, they use borough-level
gross unemployment data. Whether data measured at the level of New York’s five
boroughs adequately captures variation in social and policy conditions across the city’s
76 separate precincts is an open question. Moreover the hospital discharge data by its
nature cannot distinguish between the prevalence of crack use from powered cocaine
consumption. The standard concern in the case of poorly measured explanatory variables
is attenuation—bias towards zero in the coefficients for these covariates. Some evidence
for this concern comes from the fact that the control variables for young males and
borough cocaine consumption used by Kelling and Sousa have limited explanatory power
in their model (Table 4, KS).
We have also obtained the measures used by KS to capture variation across
precincts in the drug problem and economic conditions. Specifically, we have obtained
borough-level data on the number of unemployed people from the New York State
Department of Labor. We have also obtained data on hospital discharges for drug-related
causes from the New York State Department of Health, Bureau of Biometrics.
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In addition, however, we attempt to improve upon the KS dataset in part by
incorporating census tract-level measures of socio-demographic characteristics, taken
from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses. (Data for the inter-censal years are linearly
interpolated). Because census tract and police precinct boundaries do not perfectly
overlap in New York City, we have geocoded both tract and precinct boundaries, and
then aggregate tracts up to the precinct level by assuming that the population of tracts that
cross precinct boundaries are distributed across precincts proportionately to the tract’s
land area.97 We use these census data to calculate measures of each precinct’s age
distribution, poverty rate, female-headed households, fraction of adults with different
levels of educational attainment, median income, and welfare receipt. To measure
physical signs of disorder we also control for the fraction of housing units in the precinct
that are vacant. Put differently, compared to the data used by KS our dataset includes a
much richer set of socio-demographic covariates measured at the precinct rather than
some much larger unit of analysis.
Finally, we also incorporate into our dataset a measure of the number of police
officers assigned to each precinct in each year by the NYPD. One important conceptual
concern with the KS study is whether their key explanatory variable of interest—the
misdemeanor arrest rate—captures the effects of changes in how police resources are
deployed or instead simply reflects increased police presence. This counter-explanation
for the KS findings is of some concern because, as Kelling and Sousa note, from 1994 to
1999 the size of the NYPD force increased by about one-third (2001:19).
Descriptive statistics from our dataset on the key dependent and explanatory
variables closely match those reported by KS and by Sousa’s doctoral dissertation. For
example in Sousa’s Table 5–2, the mean number of misdemeanor arrests per precinct for
the 1989–98 period is 2247, with a standard deviation of 1968; in our dataset the mean is
equal to 2245 with a standard deviation of 1958.98 Appendix Table 1 repeats this
97

Suppose for example that census tract 1 lies entirely within precinct A, tract 2 lies entirely within
tract B, but 25% of the land area of tract 3 is in precinct A while 75% of the land area of tract 3 is within
precinct B. Let Xi be some population characteristic for tract (i), such as percent poor, and let Pi represent
the population of tract (i). In this case we calculate percent population poor in precinct A as
(P1*X1+.25*P3*X3)/(P1+.25*P3).
98
Note that following what is apparently the procedure used by KS and Sousa, these means are
calculated without weighting by precinct population, and are equal to the raw number of arrests within each
precinct, not arrest rate per precinct resident.
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comparison for 1989, 1993 and 1998, and again shows that our figures and theirs are
quite close.
Appendix Table 1
Average Misdemeanor Arrests per Precinct, Selected Years
Harcourt-Ludwig dataset
Kelling-Sousa dataset

1989
1754
1811

1993
1795
1779

1998
3034
3034

Notes: The Kelling-Sousa figures are taken from Table 2 of their (2001) Manhattan Institute report. These
figures are mean misdemeanor arrests per precinct, calculated without weighting by precinct population.

Finally, while KS do not report the mean violent crime rate for their dataset over
the entire 1989–98 period (the sum of murder, rape, robbery, and felonious assault), their
Figure 1A reports the total number of violent crimes for New York City as a whole by
year. In our dataset these figures equal 144,375 in 1989, in 1993 it is 131,310, in 1995 it
is 97,170, and in 1998 it is 70,725. Each of these numbers, and the overall trend shown in
the top panel of our Appendix Figure 1, match closely the numbers represented in their
Figure 1A.99

99

See f:\research\broken_windows2\stata\jens_descriptives_jan2105.do
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Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Bernard Harcourt
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
harcourt@uchicago.edu
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